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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been demonstrated
to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. Specifically,
adding imperceptible perturbations to clean images can
fool the well trained deep neural networks. In this pa-
per, we propose an end-to-end image compression model to
defend adversarial examples: ComDefend. The proposed
model consists of a compression convolutional neural net-
work (ComCNN) and a reconstruction convolutional neu-
ral network (RecCNN). The ComCNN is used to maintain
the structure information of the original image and purify
adversarial perturbations. And the RecCNN is used to re-
construct the original image with high quality. In other
words, ComDefend can transform the adversarial image to
its clean version, which is then fed to the trained classi-
fier. Our method is a pre-processing module, and does not
modify the classifier’s structure during the whole process.
Therefore, it can be combined with other model-specific de-
fense models to jointly improve the classifier’s robustness.
A series of experiments conducted on MNIST, CIFAR10 and
ImageNet show that the proposed method outperforms the
state-of-the-art defense methods, and is consistently effec-
tive to protect classifiers against adversarial attacks.
1. Introduction
As we know, deep learning technique [14] plays the lead-
ing role in Artificial Intelligence (AI) area, and has ushered
in a new development climax in the fields such as image
recognition [8], natural language processing [3], and speech
processing [9]. However, Szegedy et al. [19] formally pro-
pose the concept of adversarial examples which bring the
























Figure 1. The main idea of our end-to-end image compression
model to defend adversarial examples. The perturbation between
the adversarial image and the original image is very tiny, but the
perturbation is amplified during the high-level representation of
the image classification model. We use ComCNN to remove the
redundant information of the adversarial image and RecCNN to re-
construct the clean image. In this way, the influence of adversarial
perturbations is suppressed.
tible perturbations added to clean images can induce net-
works to make incorrect predictions with high confidence
during the test time, even when the amount of perturba-
tion is very small, and imperceptible to human observers.
What’s more, [12] has proved that adversarial examples also
exist in the physical-world scenarios. The existence of ad-
versarial examples has become a major security concern
in real-world applications of deep networks, such as self-
driving cars and identity recognition, etc.
In recent years, a lot of methods defending the adversar-
ial examples have been proposed. These methods can be
roughly categorized into two classes. The first class is to
enhance the robustness of neural networks itself. Adver-
sarial training [20] is a typical method among them, which
injects adversarial examples into the training data to retrain
the network. Label smoothing [22], which converts one-hot


















































Figure 2. The overview of ComDefend. The ComCNN is used to preserve the main structure information of original images. The original
24 bits map for RGB three channels is compressed into 12 bits map (each channel is assigned 4 bits). And the RecCNN is responsible for
reconstructing the clean-version original images. The gaussian noise is added on the compressed compact representation to improve the
reconstructed quality, and further enhance the defense ability.
one denotes the various pre-processing methods. For exam-
ple, In [18], Song et al. propose the PixelDefend, which
can transform the adversarial images into clean images be-
fore they are fed into the classifier. Similarly, [15] regards
the imperceptible perturbations as the noises, and designs a
high-level representation guided denoiser (HGD) to remove
these noises. HGD wins the first place in the NIPS2017
adversarial vision challenge [13]. Generally speaking, the
latter methods are more efficient because they don’t need to
retrain the neural networks. However, HGD still requires a
lot of adversarial images when training the denoiser . There-
fore, it is hard to get a good HGD in the case of few adver-
sarial images. The main idea of PixelDefend is to simulate
the distribution of image space. When the space is too large,
the result of the simulation will be bad.
Image compression is a low-level image transformation
task. Because there is strong similarity and relevance be-
tween neighbor pixels in the local structure, image com-
pression can help reduce the redundant information of an
image, while retaining the dominant information. Based on
this observation, we devised ComDefend, which utilizes the
image compression to remove adversarial perturbations or
destroy the structure of adversarial perturbations. The basic
idea of ComDefend is listed in Figure 1.
ComDefend consists of two CNN modules. The first
CNN, called compression CNN (ComCNN), is used to
transform the input image into a compact representation.
In details, the original 24-bits pixel is compressed into 12
bits. The compact representation extracted from the in-
put image is expected to retain the enough information of
the original image. The second CNN, called reconstruc-
tion CNN (RecCNN), is used to reconstruct the original im-
age with high quality. The ComCNN and RecCNN are fi-
nally combined into a unified end-to-end framework to learn
their weights. Figure 2 gives the illustration of ComDefend.
Noted that ComDefend is trained on the clean images. In
this way, the network will learn the distribution of clean im-
ages, and thus can reconstruct a clean-version image from
the adversarial image. Compared with HGD and PixelDe-
fend, ComDefend doesn’t require the adversarial examples
in training phase, and thus reduces the computation cost.
In addition, ComDefend is performed on an image with the
patch-by-patch manner instead of the whole image, which
improve the processing efficiency. The code is released at
https://github.com/jiaxiaojunQAQ/Comdefend.git.
In summary, this paper has the following contributions:
1) We propose the ComDefend, an end-to-end image
compression model to defend adversarial examples. The
ComCNN extracts the structure information of the original
image and removes the imperceptible perturbations. The
RecCNN reconstructs the input image with high quality.
During the whole process, the deployed model is not modi-
fied.
2) We design a unified learning algorithm to simulta-
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neously learn the weights of two CNN modules within
ComDefend. In addition, we find that adding gaussian noise
to the compact representation can help reconstruct better
images, and further improve the defending performance.
3) Our method greatly improves the resilience across
a wide variety of strong attacking methods, and defeats
the state-of-the-art defense models including the winner of
NIPS 2017 adversarial challenge.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 briefly reviews the related work. Section 3 introduces
the details of the proposed ComDefend. Section 4 shows a
series of experimental results. Finally, Section 5 shows the
conclusion.
2. Related work
We investigate the related work from two aspects: Attack
methods to generate adversarial examples, and Defensive
methods to resist adversarial examples.
2.1. Attack methods
In [6], Goodfellow et al. propose the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM). An adversarial example is produced by
adding increments in the gradient direction of the loss gra-
dient. After that, Basic Iterative Method (BIM) which is
the improved version of the FGSM, is proposed in [12].
Compared with FGSM, BIM performs multiple steps. This
method is also called Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) in
[16]. To deal with the selection of parameters in FGSM,
in [17], Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. propose to use an itera-
tive linearization of the classifier and geometric formulas to
generate an adversarial example. In [1], Carlini-Wagner et
al. design an efficient optimization objective (C&W) to find
the smallest perturbations. The C&W can reliably produce
samples correctly classified by human subjects but misclas-
sified in specific targets by the well-trained classifier.
2.2. Defensive methods
In [20], Adversarial training adds the adversarial images
generated by different attack methods to the training image
dataset. The growth of the training image dataset makes
the image classification model easier to simulate the dis-
tribution of the entire image space. And in [21], Warde-
Farley and Goodfellow propose label smoothing method
which uses soft targets to replace one-hot labels. The im-
age classifier is trained on the one-hot labels at first, and
then the soft targets are generated by the well-trained image
classifier. In [25], Xu et al. propose to use feature squeez-
ing methods which include the color bit depth of each pixel
and spatial smoothing to achieve defend adversarial exam-
ples. PiexlDefend is proposed in [18]. The basic idea of
PiexlDefend is to purify input images before they are fed
to the image classifier. In [15], the authors propose a high-
level representation guided denoiser(HGD) method to de-
fend adversarial examples. The proposed model is trained
on the training dataset which includes 210k clean and ad-
versarial images.
3. End-to-end image compression model
3.1. The basic idea of ComDefend
Let us first look back at the reason of adversarial ex-
amples. The adversarial examples are generated by adding
some imperceptible perturbation to the clean images. The
added perturbation is too slight to be perceptible to humans.
However, when the adversarial examples are fed to a deep
learning network, the effect of the imperceptible pertur-
bation increases rapidly along with the deepth of the net-
work. Therefore, the carefully designed perturbation will
fool powerful CNNs. More specifically, from previously
related researches, we can regard the imperceptible pertur-
bation as the noise with the particular structure. Kurakin et
al. in [12] consider that this kind of noise which can fool
powerful CNNs exists in the real world. In other words, the
perturbations do not affect the structure information of the
original image. The imperceptible perturbations can be con-
sidered as the redundant information of the images. From
this point of view, we can use the characteristics of image
redundancy information in image compression model to de-
fend adversarial examples.
In order to remove the imperceptible perturbations or
break up the particular structure of the imperceptible per-
turbations, we propose an end-to-end image compression
model which not only compresses the input image but also
transforms the input image to a clean image. As shown in
Figure 2, the image compression model contains the com-
pression and reconstruction processes. During the com-
pression process, the ComCNN extracts the image struc-
ture information and removes the redundant information of
the image. During the reconstruction process, the RecCNN
reconstructs the input image without the adversarial pertur-
bations. In particular, the ComCNN compress the 24-bits
pixel image into 12 bits. That is to say, the 12-bits pixel
image removes the redundancy information of the original
image and preserves the main information of the original
image. And thus the RecCNN use the 12-bits pixel image
to reconstruct the original image. During the whole pro-
cess, we hope that the 12-bits pixel images extracted from
the original image and adversarial example are as same as
possible. Therefore, we can transform the adversarial ex-
ample into the clean image.
3.2. Structure of the ComCNN
ComCNN consists of 9 weight layers, which can com-
press the input image into the 12-bits pixel image. That is
to say, the main structure information of the input image








Figure 3. The comparison results in ComDefend whether to add gaussian noises. In each subfigure, The top images are original images,
The middle images are the compressed 12bits maps and the bottom images are the reconstructed images. (a) ComDefend reconstructs the
image through the un-binarized 12bits map. (b) Without gaussian noises, ComDefend reconstructs the image through the binarized 12bits
map. (c) With gaussian noises, ComDefend reconstructs the image through the binarized 12bits map. We see the reconstructed quality in
(c) is the same with that in (a). That means the increment information of un-binarized maps are actually noises. Therefore, when gaussian
noises are added on the binarized maps, the better images are reconstructed.
Table 1. Hyperparameters of the ComCNN Layers
layer type output channels input channels filter size
1st layer conv+ELU 16 3 3× 3
2nd layer Conv+ELU 32 16 3× 3
3rd layer Conv+ELU 64 32 3× 3
4th layer Conv+ELU 128 64 3× 3
5th layer Conv+ELU 356 128 3× 3
6th layer Conv+ELU 128 256 3× 3
7th layer Conv+ELU 64 128 3× 3
8th layer Conv+ELU 32 64 3× 3
9th layer Conv 12 32 3× 3
Table 2. Hyperparameters of the RecCNN Layers
layer type output channels input channels filter size
1st layer Conv+ELU 32 12 3× 3
2nd layer Conv+ELU 64 32 3× 3
3rd layer Conv+ELU 128 64 3× 3
4th layer Conv+ELU 256 128 3× 3
5th layer Conv+ELU 128 256 3× 3
6th layer Conv+ELU 64 128 3× 3
7th layer Conv+ELU 32 64 3× 3
8th layer Conv+ELU 16 32 3× 3
9th layer Conv 3 16 3× 3
imperceptible perturbation of the input image is removed.
The combination of convolution and ELU [2] are used in
ComCNN. As shown in Table 1, ComCNN consists of two
components, the first one is used to extract the features of
the original image and generate 256 feature maps. The 1st
to the 4th layers which consist of 32 filters of size 3×3×3,
64 filters of size 3 × 3 × 32, 128 filters of size 3 × 3 × 64
and 256 filters of size 3 × 3 × 128 are the main part of the
first component. And the ELU nonlinearity is used as an
activation function. The second one is used to downscale
and enhance the features of the input image. The 5th to the
9th layers which consist of 128 filters of size 3 × 3 × 256,
64 filters of size 3×3×128, 64 filters of size 3×3×64, 32
filters of size 3×3×64 and 3 filters of size 3×3×32 are the
main part of the second component. The ComCNN is used
to extract the features of the original image and construct
the compact representation.
3.3. Structure of the RecCNN
RecCNN consists of 9 weight layers, which is used to re-
construct the original image without the imperceptible per-
turbation. As shown in Table 2, For the 1st layer to the
9th layers, 32 filters of size 3 × 3 × 12, 64 filters of size
3× 3× 32, 128 filters of size 3× 3× 64, 256 filters of size
3×3×128, 128 filters of size 3×3×256, 64 filters of size
3 × 3 × 128, 64 filters of size 3 × 3 × 64, 32 filters of size
3×3×64 and 3 filters of size 3×3×32 are used, and ELU
is added. The RecCNN makes use of the compact repre-
sentation to reconstruct the output image. The output image
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has the fewer perturbations than the input image. That is to
say, the output image can break up the particular structure
of the perturbations. In this way, the compression model
can defend the adversarial examples.
3.4. Loss functions
As for ComCNN, the goal of the ComCNN is to use
more 0 to encode the image information. Therefore, the
loss function of the ComCNN can be defined as:
L1(θ1) = λ‖Com(θ1, x)‖2, (1)
where θ1 is the trainable parameter of the ComCNN,
Com() represents the ComCNN, and λ is a super param-
eter which we use a large number experiments to certify.
Please refer to Section 4 for more details.
As for RecCNN, the goal of the RecCNN is expected to
reconstruct the original image with high quality. Therefore,




Σ‖Rec(θ2, Com(θ1, x) + ϕ)− x‖2, (2)
where Com() is the ComCNN, θ2 represents the trainable
parameter of the RecCNN, Rec() represents the RecCNN,
θ1 represents the trained parameter of the ComCNN. And ϕ
represents the random Gaussian noise.
In order to make the compression model more effective,
we design a unified loss function to simultaneously update




Σ‖Rec(θ2, Com(θ1, x) + ϕ)− x‖2
+λ‖Com(θ1, x)‖2.
(3)
According to this loss function, it is clear that both Com-
CNN and RecCNN work together to resist the noise attack.
The parameters θ1, θ2 are upgraded at the same time during
the model training.
3.5. Learning algorithm
In order to train the compression model, we design a uni-
fied learning algorithm for both ComCNN and RecCNN.
The optimization goal for ComDefend is formulated as:
(θ1, θ2) = argmin(
1
2N
Σ‖Rec(θ2, Rec(θ1, x) + ϕ)− x‖2
+‖Com(θ1, x)‖2),
(4)
where x is the input image. ϕ represents the random Gaus-
sian noise. θ1 and θ2 are the parameters of ComCNN and
RecCNN respectively. Com() represents the ComCNN and
Rec() represents RecCNN.
During the whole process, the ComCNN encodes the in-
put image x into a same size image y with each pixel oc-
cupies 12 floats. Then the sigmoid function is used to limit
Table 3. The experiments versus selection of compression bits
Compressed bits 8 10 12 14 16
PSNR 31.01 31.01 31.78 28.77 30.95
the image y to between 0 and 1. Note that, the sigmoid out-
put makes use of the different shades of gray information to
represent the input image instead of 0 and 1. And RecCNN
can reconstruct the original image through these shades of
gray information. If these shades of gray information are
binarized, the main structure information of original image
is completely lost. In order to deal with this problem, we
propose to use the noise attack.
In particular, we add the random Gaussian noise ϕ (the
mean of the gaussian noise is 0 and the variance of the gaus-
sian noise is ϕ) to the output before the sigmoid function.
The information encoded with 0 and 1 is easier to resist the
noise attack. Therefore, during the training, the compres-
sion model learns to use the binary information to defend
the noise attack. As shown in Figure 3, we can see that
adding the random gaussian noise contributes to improving
the performance of the compression model. In addition, We
choose the compression bits mainly according to the recon-
structed performance. We try different compression bits in
Table 3, and find the 12 bits show the best PSNR recon-
structed performance.
3.6. Network implementation
The weights of the ComCNN and the RecCNN are ini-
tialized by using the method in [7]. We also use Adam
algorithm [10] with parameters setting α = 0.001, β1 =
0.9, β2 = 0.999 and ε = 10−8 to upgrade the weights of
the compression model. After the hyperparameters γ and
λ being confirmed, we train ComCNN and RecCNN for 30
epochs using a batch size of 50. The learning rate is decayed
exponentially from 0.01 to 0.0001 for 30 epochs.
4. Experimental results and analysis
In this section, in order to evaluate the performance
of the proposed method, we conduct several experiments,
which include: generation of adversarial examples, selec-
tion of hyper parameters in neural networks, image classi-
fication with the proposed method, comparisons with other
defensive methods and performance analysis. The proposed
method can significantly perform well against the state-of-
the-art adversarial attacks.
4.1. Datasets for training and testing
In order to clearly verify our proposed method, the Com-
CNN and RecCNN training are based on the 50,000 clean
(not perturbed) images of the CIFAR-10 dataset [11]. For
testing, we use 10,000 testing images in the CIFAR-10
dataset, 10,000 testing images in the Fashion-mnist [23] and
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Table 4. THE SELECTION OF PARAMETERS IN THE OUR PROPOSED METHOD .
ϕ = 1.0 ϕ = 10.0 ϕ = 20.0 ϕ = 25.0 ϕ = 30.0 ϕ = 35.0 ϕ = 40.0 ϕ = 50.0 Average
λ = 0.01 68.39% 90.22% 86.69% 87.52% 86.12% 85.42% 86.22% 86.71% 84.66%
λ = 0.001 88.99% 89.64% 72.23% 90.23% 91.09% 90.41% 90.55% 90.56% 87.96%
λ = 0.0001 89.61% 90.77% 91.82% 90.98% 89.45% 91.24% 90.61% 90.33% 90.60%
λ = 0.00001 89.06% 91.65% 90.99% 91.37% 90.74% 91.05% 90.25% 90.65% 90.72%
λ = 0.0 90.00% 90.39% 91.45% 91.27% 91.01% 90.88% 88.18% 90.10% 90.41%
Average 85.19% 90.53% 86.63% 90.27% 89.88% 89.80% 89.16% 89.67% 88.89%
1000 random images of the imagenet dataset [4]. We also
train ResNet [8] which is one of the state-of-the-art deep
neural network image classifiers in recent years on these
three datasets.
4.2. Adversarial examples
In the literature, three common distance metrics are used
for generating adversarial examples: L0, L2, L∞. L0 rep-
resents the number of the different pixels between the clean
image and adversarial example. L2 measures the standard
Euclidean distance between the clean image and adversar-
ial example. L∞ represents the maximum value of the im-
perceptible perturbation in the adversarial example. In [22],
Goodfellow et al. argue to useL∞ to construct the adversar-
ial examples. And the related research literature main use
L2 and L∞ to conduct related researches. Therefore, we
make use of L2 and L∞ to achieve the adversarial attacks.
In particular, we use the L∞ distance metric to achieve
FSGM, BIM and DeepFool adversarial attacks and the L2
distance metric to achieve C&W adversarial attacks.
4.3. Selection of hyper parameters
There are two hyper parameters in the neural networks
that need to be determined by a large number of experi-
ments. The first one is the standard normal distribution
gaussian noise parameter ϕ, and the second one is the
penalty item parameter λ. In order to improve the perfor-
mance of the proposed method, the value of ϕ and λ is de-
pending on the performance of image classification. Specif-
ically, image compression discards part of the image infor-
mation even if it retains the main structural information of
the image. In order to keep the accuracy of image classi-
fier, we compute the average accuracy of the well-trained
Resnet50 on the 1000 random images of the cifar-10 train-
ing dataset. For more details, please refer to Table 4.
From Table 4, we can see that when the parameter λ is
fixed, the accuracy of the classifier first increases and then
decreases with the increase of parameter ϕ. More specifi-
cally, when parameter λ = 0.0001 and ϕ = 1.0 ∼ 20.0,
the average accuracy increases constantly. But when pa-
rameter λ = 0.0001 and ϕ = 20.0 ∼ 50.0, the average
accuracy decreases constantly. That is, when the noise is
too large, the network is not enough to resist it, resulting in
a decline in network performance and when the noise is too
small, the network learns to use the gray scale information
Figure 4. The classification accuracy of ResNet-50 on adversar-
ial images produced by four attacks using the proposed method at
the test time and at training and test time. The dotted line repre-
sents the accuracy of the ResNet-50 model on adversarial images
without any defense.
between 0 and 1 to encode the image instead of using 0 and
1. Similarly, when the parameter ϕ is fixed, the accuracy
of the classifier first increases and then decreases with the
decrease of parameter λ. Therefore, the appropriate param-
eter settings can protect the accuracy of image classifica-
tion models. In accordance with Table 4, λ = 0.0001 and
ϕ = 20.0 can obtain the best performance of the classifier.
In addition, In this paper, the value of the parameter λ is
0.0001 and the value of the parameter ϕ is 20.0.
4.4. Image classification with the proposed method
Simply detecting adversarial images is not sufficient for
the task of the image classification. It is often critical to
be able to correctly classify adversarial examples. In this
section, there are two scenarios where our proposed method
is used to defend the adversarial attacks. One is using the
image compression at test time, the other is using the image
compression at training and test time.
4.4.1 Image compression at test time
The image classification model has been trained on the
clean images. The test images consist of clean images and
4326
Table 5. THE RESULT OF COMPARISONS WITH OTHER DEFENSIVE METHODS(CIFAR-10 ,L∞ = 2/8/16)
Network Defensive method Clean FGSM BIM DeepFool C&W
Resnet50
In training time
Normal 92%/92%/92% 39%/20%/18% 08%/00%/00% 21%/01%/01% 17%/00%/00%
Adversarial FGSM 91%/91%/91% 88%/91%/91% 24%/07%/00% 45%/00%/00% 20%/00%/07%
Adversarial BIM 87%/87%/87% 80%/52%/34% 74%/32%/06% 79%/48%/25% 76%/42%/08%
Label Smoothing 92%/92%/92% 73%/54%/28% 59%/08%/01% 56%/20%/10% 30%/02%/02%
Proposed method 92%/92%/92% 89%/89%/87% 84%/47%/40% 90%/90%/90% 91%/90%/90%
In test time
Feature Squeezing 84%/84%/84% 31%/20%/18% 13%/00%/00% 75%/75%/75% 78%/78%/78%
PiexlDefend 85%/85%/88% 73%/46%/24% 71%/46%/25% 80%/80%/80% 78%/78%/78%
Proposed method 91%/91%/91% 86%/84%/83% 78%/41%/34% 88%/88%/88% 89%/87%/87%
Table 6. THE RESULT OF COMPARISONS WITH OTHER DEFENSIVE METHODS(Fashion-mnist ,L∞ = 8/25)
Network DefensiveMethod Clean FGSM BIM DeepFool C&W
Resnet50
Normal 93%/93% 38%/24% 00%/00% 06%/06% 00%/00%
Adversarial FGSM 93%/93% 85%/85% 51%/00% 63%/07% 67%/21%
Adversarial BIM 92%/91% 84%/79% 76%/63% 82%/72% 81%/70%
Label Smoothing 93%/83% 73%/45% 16%/00% 29%/06% 33%/14%
Feature Squeezing 84%/84% 70%/28% 56%/25% 83%/83% 83%/83%
PiexlDefend 89%/89% 87%/82% 85%/83% 88%/88% 88%/88%
Proposed method 93%/93% 89%/89% 70%/60% 90%/89% 88%/89%
adversarial images. They are first compressed and recon-
structed by the proposed method, and then they are fed to
the well-trained classifier. Fig 4 shows the accuracy of im-
age classification model(Resnet50) which are tested on the
adversarial examples produced by the four attacks. The dot-
ted lines show the accuracy of image classification models
tested on the adversarial images with no defense. In this re-
spect, the proposed method using at the test time increases
accuracy on the FGSM strongest attack from 35% to 83%,
the BIM strongest attack from 0% to 31%, the DeepFool
strongest attack from 1% to 89% and the C&W strongest
attack from 0% to 87% for CIFAR-10.
4.4.2 Image compression at training and test time
There is another way to defend the adversarial examples,
that is to say, we apply the proposed method during the
training and test time. In particular, During the training
time, we train the image classification models on trans-
formed cifar-10 training images. We first use the ComCNN
to compress the input image into the compact representa-
tion, and then use the RecCNN to reconstruct the input im-
age before feeding it to the network. As for the test time,
the test image is transformed by the proposed method be-
fore being fed to the well-trained classifier. As shown in Fig
4, we can see that the proposed method at training and test
time increases accuracy on the FGSM strongest attack from
35% to 83%, the BIM strongest attack from 0% to 31%, the
DeepFool strongest attack from 1% to 89% and the C&W
strongest attack from 0% to 87% for CIFAR-10.
4.4.3 Comparisons with other defensive methods
In order to quantitatively measure the performance of our
proposed method, we compare the proposed method with
other conventional schemes under the L∞ distance metric.
The result of the comparison on the Cifar-10 image dataset
is shown in Table 5. During training and test time, com-
pared with these methods, our proposed method achieves
huge performance improvement. In particular, it achieves
nearly 90% accuracy on the FGSM, DeepFool and C&W
attack methods. Compared with the image classification
model on the clean images, the accuracy of the model on
the adversarial examples does not decline a lot. As for de-
fense applied in test time, the proposed method can achieve
about 85% accuracy on the FGSM, DeepFool and C&W
attack methods. As for BIM attack, the performance is im-
proved by using our proposed method. And Table 6 shows
the result of the comparison with other defensive methods
on the Fashion-mnist image dataset. The performance is
improved a lot by using the proposed method on FGSM,
DeepFool and C&W attack methods. More importantly, we
do comparison experiment with HGD and ICLR2018[24]
method on the imagenet dataset. As shown in Table 7, the
proposed method improves the performance of defending
the FGSM, DeepFool and C&W attack methods. And to
test more attacking methods, we add the deepfool and C&W
methods. The results are shown in Table 8. We see that the
proposed method achieves the higher defensive accuracy
against FGSM, DeepFool, MI-FGSM [5] and C&W, and
the competitive accuracy against IFGSM compared with
HGD, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed
method. Note that the  for IFGSM is set to 3 and 5, rather 8
and 16, because we find when the attack is too strong (when
L∞ >= 8), the noises are perceptible to human eyes. And
thus, the adversarial examples can be easily distinguished
by human beings, and the defense methods are not neces-
sary. In fact, the core advantage of our method is that
we train our network on the clean images rather than
adversarial images. In this way, we don’t need to use at-
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Table 7. THE RESULT OF COMPARISONS WITH OTHER DEFENSIVE METHODS(Imagenet ,L∞ = 8/13/20)
Network DefensiveMethod Clean FGSM BIM DeepFool C&W
Resnet101
Normal 76%/76%/76% 03%/03%/03% 00%/00%/00% 01%/01%/01% 00%/00%/00%
HGD 54%/54%/54% 51%/50%/50% 36%/36%/36% 52%/52%/52% 51%/51%/51%
Proposed method 67%/67%/67% 56%/56%/56% 12%/12%/10% 53%/53%/52% 54%/54%/53%
Table 8. Comparison results with HGD on ImageNet (L∞ = 8/16)
Network Defense Clean FGSM IFGSM(3/5) MI-FGSM Deepfool C&W
IncResV2
Normal 86% 34%/30% 10%/5% 13%/7% 13%/11% 0%/0%
HGD 54% 47%/48% 42%/42% 46%/44% 48%/48% 48%/48%
Our method 77% 62%/61% 51%/42% 50%/40% 60%/60% 61%/63%
IncV3
Normal 83% 20%/18% 57%/49% 57%/50% 12%/11% 0%/0%
HGD 70% 60%/60% 62%/61% 62%/62% 60%/60% 59%/59%
Our method 74% 62%/61% 64%/60% 69%/64% 60%/60% 60%/60%
IncV4
Normal 88% 28%/26% 6%/1% 4%/1% 17%/15% 0%/0%
HGD 64% 56%/56% 51%/50% 57%/52% 59%/59% 59%/59%
Our method 74% 58%/56% 50%/46% 50%/40% 60%/60% 61%/60%
Table 9. Comparison results with ICLR2018 on ImageNet
Network Defensive Method FGSM-8 FGSM-12 Deepfool C&W
IncResV2
Normal 34% 32% 13% 0%
ICLR2018 62% 50% 55% 59%
Our method 62% 61% 60% 61%
tacking methods to generate adversarial examples, and
thus the training data set is much smaller than HGD,
and the training time is also much less than HGD. Be-
sides, our method performes the compression based on
the patch rather than the entire image, therefore, the
testing time is reduced (the HGD takes 2.7 seconds to
process an image. But the proposed method only takes
1.2 seconds to process the same image). We give the com-
parison results with [24] in Table 9. The results shows that
our method can achieve the higher accuracy against deep-
fool, C&W, and FGSM with  = 8, 12 than [24], which
verifies the effectiveness of our method. Furthermore, our
proposed method does not depend on attacking methods and
classifiers. And it can be combined with other defensive
methods.
4.5. Analysis for the proposed method
For the test time, the proposed method transforms the in-
put image to a clean image. And it breaks up the particular
structure of the perturbations in the adversarial examples.
Specifically, the ComCNN encode the input image into a
compact representation. During this process, the impercep-
tible perturbations do not affect the result of the compact
representation. In other words, the output images of the
clean image and adversarial image are as same as possi-
ble. Because during the training of the network, the network
learns to resist the stronger gaussian noise attack to encode
the input images. For the training and test time, the pro-
posed method compresses the space of the real samples. For
the uncompressed space, there are 32×32×28×28×28 im-
ages in this space. But for the compressed space, there only
are 32×32×24×24×24 images in this space. In this way,
the proposed method makes the existing image classifica-
tion models easier to simulate the image distribution. The
mezzanine is between the decision surface trained by the
classifier and the real surface of the sample data becomes
smaller. That is to say, the probability of the adversarial
example occurrence becomes smaller than before.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an end-to-end image compres-
sion model to defend adversarial examples. ComDefend
can be used in test time and in training and test time. As for
test time, it defends the adversarial examples by destroying
the structure of adversarial perturbations in the adversarial
image. As for training and test time, it achieves defense by
compressing the image space. In this way, it reduces the
search space available for an adversary to construct adver-
sarial examples. ComDefend can achieve higher accuracy
on FGSM, DeepFool and C&W attack methods compared
with the state-of-the-art defense methods. And the perfor-
mance on BIM attack also improves by using our proposed
method. More importantly, ComDefend is performed on an
image with the patch-by-patch manner instead of the whole
image, which is taken less time to deal with the input image.
Our work demonstrates that the performance of classifying
the adversarial examples is dramatically improved by using
the proposed method.
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